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INTRODUCTION

Can people expect buildings and infrastructure to last,
keeping their occupants sheltered from the elements, free to go
about their business? The professionals who design facilities—
as well as the taxpayers and entrepreneurs who fund them—
make this assumption, but is this a safe assumption to make?
Contemplate the effect of one extreme event—a magnitude 9.0
earthquake along the Cascadia Subduction Zone of the Pacific
coast—and it is easy to realize that this is not a safe
assumption.1 Though seismic technology can be used to fortify
structures against extreme events and land use plans can keep
development out of harm’s way, the adoption of these
measures has not kept pace with scientific understanding of
the risks, and the ensuing scenarios of mega-quakes portend
widespread devastation across the urban landscape.2 For the
* Associate Professor of Urban Design and Planning, College of Built
Environments, University of Washington, janwhit@uw.edu.
1. Ryan Haas, What is a 9.0 Earthquake?, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Sept. 25, 2015
7:37 AM), http://www.opb.org/news/series/unprepared/what-is-a-90-earthquake-/.
2. The Western Washington University Resilience Institute put together a scenario
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benefit of all involved, it may be helpful to recognize the
barriers that prevent people from making investments that
will withstand the test of time, because many such obstacles
can be overcome with sound capital investment planning. This
essay situates the problem of human vulnerability to extreme
earthquakes within the emerging empirical science of
behavioral economics. When science makes biases in capital
investment predictable, solutions become self-evident.
Many of the obstacles that stand in the way of seismically
safe choices for buildings and infrastructure originate from the
ways in which people view the past, present, and future.
Economists have recognized for quite some time that although
humans are rational thinkers, our thinking becomes distorted
when asked to make a choice today in light of the past, or
when making a choice today that will have lasting
consequences.3 People may have a desire to make economically
forecasting devastation from a mega-quake, which states:
Should the earthquake and tsunami happen tomorrow, it could affect millions of
people’s lives, property, infrastructure, and environment. The number of deaths
could exceed 10,000, and more than 30,000 people could be injured. . . . For
Washington and Oregon, the direct economic losses have been estimated at
upward of $81 billion. These social and economic impacts could distress the region
for years to come.
W. WASH. U. RESILIENCE INST., CASCADIA RISING EXERCISE SCENARIO DOCUMENT 20
(2015),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3149654/Cascadia-Rising-2016Exercise-Scenario.pdf. “Megaquake” is a shortened term for a “megathrust
earthquake.”;
Earthquakes … [of magnitude greater than or equal to] 8.7, … present hazards to
lives and property that are far more extensive than a typical ‘great’ earthquake.
We therefore adopt the term ‘megathrust earthquake’ after the common usage
among paleoseismologists for exceptionally destructive earthquakes.
Jeffrey Park et al., Performance Review of the Global Seismographic Network for the
Sumatra-Andaman Megathrust Earthquake, 76 SEISMOLOGICAL RESEARCH LETTERS
331, 329 (2005); See also Subduction Zone: Tsunamis Generated by Megathrust
Earthquakes,
INC.
RES.
INST.
FOR
SEISMOLOGY,
https://www.iris.edu/hq/inclass/animation/subduction_zone_tsunamis_generated_by_m
egathrust_earthquakes (last visited May 11, 2017) (“Megathrust earthquakes are: the
most powerful earthquakes in the world [and] occur where two plates converge
particularly in subduction zones”);
“Very large earthquakes occur on fault areas where the slope is the most regular,
or flat.” The Cascadia fault … lies along such a flat region, [noted] Rempel and
Thomas… [and] Thomas said… “When Cascadia goes, it could be 1,000 kilometers
(621 miles) if it ruptures completely.”
Press Release, EUREKALERT!, Fault Curvature May Control Where Big Quakes Occur
(Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2016-11/uoo-fcm112216.php.
3. A. C. Pigou, discussing the tendency in economic exchange to discount rewards
over time:
Generally speaking, everybody prefers present pleasures or satisfactions of a given
magnitude to future pleasures or satisfactions of equal magnitude, even when the
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rational decisions, but are limited in their ability to do so by
the context in which their decisions are made, their learning,
and their beliefs about the choices before them.4
The following paragraphs explain how bounded rationality,
interpreted as three sources of bias in capital investments over
time, give rise to seismically vulnerable built environments.
First, decisions made today are tempered by past investments
in the built environment, though past investments were often
made without regard to current known hazards in the
landscape. Second, despite widespread general knowledge of
the threat of earthquakes, the human propensity to
disproportionately value short-term benefits over long-term
gains creates an incentive for people to avoid the expenditures
necessary to safeguard capital assets. Third, the presentation
of hazards in the landscape as risks in the future exacerbates
these problems by levying the human habit of absorbing risk
with inadequate attention to the consequences. To make more
lasting investments in the built environment we must guard
against these sources of bias. This essay concludes by outlining
simple capital planning remedies.

latter are perfectly certain to occur. But this preference for present pleasures does
not—the idea is self-contradictory—imply that a present pleasure of given
magnitude is any greater than a future pleasure of the same magnitude. It implies
only that our telescopic faculty is defective.
A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 24–25 (4th ed. 1932) (emphasis in original).
4. Herbert Simon discusses the empirical evidence of bounds on rationality yet to be
incorporated in economic theories of decision-making:
We already have in psychology a substantial body of empirically tested theory
about the processes people actually use to make boundedly rational, or reasonable
decisions. This body of theory asserts that the processes are sensitive to the
complexity of decision-making contexts and to learning processes as well. The
application of this procedural theory of rationality to economics requires extensive
empirical research, much of it at micro-micro levels, to determine specifically how
process is molded to context in actual economic environments and the
consequences of this interaction for the economic outcomes of these processes.
Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209, S223
(1986); See also David Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003) (“Our research attempted
to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that
separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal
beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models”).

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017

3

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7

2017]

II.

INVEST TO WITHSTAND THE TEST OF TIME

447

EARTHQUAKES TRANSFORM INVESTMENTS INTO
LIABILITIES

Human settlements rarely stray from the historical path of
prior investments because people use the economic and social
success of past investments to guide the choices they make
today.5 Locational patterns of investment evolve from small
historical events: from chance historical events, opportunities
arise and grow into centers of commerce that attract and
retain an expert labor force.6 Seemingly small acts—such as
the 1968 purchase of a computer at Seattle’s Lakeside Middle
School for a club that included 8th grader Bill Gates, Jr. and
his subsequent access to computer labs at the University of
Washington—can be thought of retrospectively as chance
events on the path toward the formation of Microsoft, a pivotal
entity in the evolution of technology and commerce in the
greater Seattle region.7 Such events form paths within the
greater historical context of the educational institutions,
infrastructure investments, resource-based industries, and
ports of trade that have served the Puget Sound. 8 Reinforced
by existing development patterns, decisions about where to
build mark attempts to gain increasing returns from existing
infrastructure, services, and associated economic conditions,
such as opportunities for education, employment, and return
on investment.9
5. See Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92–
99; For a more general treatment of the economics of geography, see generally
MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999).
6. See Arthur, supra note 5, at 92–99.
7. Quoting Bill Gates Jr. on the time when he first began to program computers,
“It was my obsession” Gates says of his early high school years. “I skipped
athletics. I went up there at night. We were programming on weekends. It would
be a rare week that we wouldn’t get twenty or thirty hours in. There was a period
where Paul Allen and I got in trouble for stealing a bunch of passwords and
crashing the system. We got kicked out. I didn’t get to use the computer the whole
summer. This is when I was fifteen and sixteen. Then I found out Paul had found
a computer that was free at the University of Washington. They had these
machines in the medical center and the physics department. They were on a
twenty-four-hour schedule, but with this big slack period, so that between three
and six in the morning they never scheduled anything.” Gates laughed. “I’d leave
at night, after my bedtime. I could walk up to the University of Washington from
my house, or I’d take the bus. That’s why I’m always so generous to the University
of Washington, because they let me steal so much computer time.”
MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 52–53 (2008).
8. See generally PLANNING THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (Jill Sterrett et al. eds., 2015).
9. See Arthur, supra note 5, at 92–99.
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The historical path-dependence of human settlements may
appear to be more of a liability than a benefit, however, when
juxtaposed against the advancing science of earthquakes. The
science of extreme events is relatively new to the scene of
human settlement. The population of the Puget Sound had
already reached about 500,000 by 1915, when Alfred Wegener
published evidence for the theory of continental drift in The
Origin of Continents and Oceans.10 Wegener’s publication
sparked a debate that was not settled until the 1960s after the
discovery of oceanic ridges and trenches and the role of
subduction in making the Pacific Rim into a “ring of fire”—
where earthquakes 9.0 or greater in magnitude are known to
occur.11 Scientists were aware that the Juan de Fuca plate was
sliding beneath the coastline of the Pacific Northwest, creating
the Cascadia Subduction Zone, yet were still unaware of any
earthquakes caused by this motion.12 It was not until the
1990s—after the Puget Sound surpassed 2.5 million
residents—that historical evidence of a 9.0 earthquake on
January 26, 1700 was pieced together, and scientists began in
earnest to understand the vulnerability of this region to
earthquakes.13 Since then, a 2012 analysis has confirmed that
the region experienced nineteen earthquakes along the length
of the subduction zone over the past 10,000 years, ranging in
magnitude from 8.7 to 9.2.14 A more recent study suggests, on

10. For historic population estimates, see Tom Trimbath, Seattle, King County and
Puget Sound Keep on Growing, CURBED SEATTLE (JULY 14, 2016, 8:00 AM),
http://seattle.curbed.com/2016/7/14/12179970/seattle-king-county-puget-sound-growthpopulation; Plate Tectonics: The Rocky History of an Idea, U. OF CAL. MUSEUM OF
PALEONTOLOGY, http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/geology/techist.html (last visited May
13, 2017) (citing ALFRED WEGENER, THE ORIGIN OF CONTINENTS AND OCEANS (John
Biram trans., 1915)).
11. See Plate Tectonics: The Rocky History of an Idea, supra note 10.
12. Kathryn Schulz, The Really Big One, THE NEW YORKER (July 20, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/the-really-big-one;
Robert
Yates
discusses the emergence of the science in Chapter 4 of his book, Living with
Earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest. ROBERT YEATS, LIVING WITH EARTHQUAKES IN
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 61–90 (Oregon State University Press eds., 2004)
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/oer/earthquake/index.html (ebook).
13. Schulz, supra note 12; Yeats, supra note 12, at 61–90; Trimbath, supra note 10.
14. In a press release from Oregon State University, lead researcher Chris
Goldfinger described the findings:
“Over the past 10,000 years, there have been 19 earthquakes that extended along
most of the margin, stretching from southern Vancouver Island to the OregonCalifornia border,” Goldfinger noted. “These would typically be of a magnitude
from about 8.7 to 9.2 – really huge earthquakes. We’ve also determined that there
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average, a recurrence interval of 430 years for quakes of this
size, though the time between events has been as low as 100 to
300 years.15 This is not welcome news to the Puget Sound. The
region is approaching four million residents with no sign of
slowing; much of this growth is in the vulnerable area west of
the peaks of the Cascade Range, in the vicinity of Interstate5.16 When considering the possible effect of a 9.0 earthquake
across Western Washington today, an estimated 5.4 million
people are at risk.17
This 200-year mismatch of timing between human
settlement of Puget Sound and the science of earthquakes has
profound implications. These scientific discoveries threaten to
transform the physical assets of the entire region into
liabilities. People have made capital investments seeking
increasing returns, but investments made without knowledge
of vulnerability and fortification against damage through
siting, design, and construction, may be nothing more than
sunk costs. People may not realize the extent to which their
have been 22 additional earthquakes that involved just the southern end of the
fault,” he added. “We are assuming that these are slightly smaller – more like 8.0
– but not necessarily. They were still very large earthquakes that if they
happened today could have a devastating impact.”
Mark Floyd, 13-Year Cascadia Study Complete – And Earthquake Risk Looms Large,
OR. ST. U. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2012/jul/13-yearcascadia-study-complete-%E2%80%93-and-earthquake-risk-looms-large.
15. Kale Williams, Risk of Major Quake on Cascadia Subduction Zone Higher than
Previously
Thought,
THE
OREGONIAN
(Aug.
19,
2016,
10:57
AM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2016/08/risk_of_major_quake_on_cascadi.html (“The northernmost
section [of the Cascadia Subduction Zone], from Astoria [Oregon] to Vancouver Island
in British Columbia, had its quake frequency revised down from an earthquake every
500 to 530 years down to one every 430 years”); History of Earthquakes in Cascadia,
CASCADIA REGIONAL EARTHQUAKE WORKGROUP http://www.crew.org/earthquakeinformation/history-of-earthquakes-in-cascadia, (“Scientists believe the most recent
subduction zone earthquake, a M9 event, occurred in January 1700. . . . the years
between these events have been as few as 100 to 300 years”) (last visited June 11,
2017); see also Haas, supra note 1 (graph of “Cascadia Earthquake Time Line”).
16. See Trimbath, supra note 10 (discussing population growth in the Puget Sound);
Gary Lettman et al., Protecting Working Farm and Forest Landscapes: How Do Oregon
and Washington Compare?, in PLANNING THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 51 (Jill Sterrett et
al. eds., 2015) (noting land use change and population growth west of the Cascade
Range from 1974 to 2009 during which “[a]pproximately 90 percent of the development
of private land in western Oregon and Washington occurred within 30 miles of
Interstate 5”).
17. Sandi Doughton et al., Seismic Neglect: The Earthquake Nightmare Public
Officials are Failing to Confront, THE SEATTLE TIMES (May 14, 2016),
http://projects.seattletimes.com/2016/seismic-neglect/.
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investments have devolved into sunk costs until disaster
strikes, when they are forced to weigh the full value of losses
against the benefits they had hoped to obtain. The population
of the Puget Sound and greater Cascadia region is at risk
because the built environment is mainly comprised of
structures that were not designed to withstand an earthquake
with a magnitude of 9.0.
III. GENERAL THREATS OF EARTHQUAKE OFFER
INADEQUATE COUNSEL
Despite current knowledge of earthquakes, people struggle
to visualize the future effects of such hazards on existing
facilities. 18 The vulnerability of capital assets to earthquakes is
not common knowledge; it is specialized knowledge in
engineering. Vulnerability can persist despite evidence of
earthquake risk because bias in favor of present-day rewards
gives momentum to developers in real estate who speculate in
land, develop properties, and sell to the highest bidder, and
who may continue to profit as they impart risk to the persons
who purchase and occupy the property. Developers retain the
expertise necessary to comply with protective seismic codes for
buildings and construction, if policymakers are willing to
impose this requirement. Regardless, the people who
ultimately purchase property may be aware that the region
suffers from earthquakes, but are not likely to have specialized
knowledge of the vulnerability of individual properties to
earthquakes.
In the absence of specialized knowledge, people make capital
investments according to preferences in settlement patterns
that appear rational, such as the choice of a home in proximity
to employers and family, but also subject to biases in decisionmaking that appear less rational. In general, people are more
emotional about the investments they make than one might

18. Nate Berg, When, Not if: How Do San Franciscans Live with the Threat of the
Next
Quake?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(March
27,
2014,
4:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/mar/27/san-francisco-live-constant-risk-nextmajor-quake#img-4 (“Earthquakes are just one example of how we all have a problem
with risks that are very infrequent, low probability, despite their high consequence . . .
. Cities around the world are exposed to a variety of low-likelihood but highconsequence events, and because of our psychological nature, we’re not very good at
assessing the risks”).
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imagine from economic descriptions of rational actors.19 For
example, the fear of loss is more powerful than gain, and this
tendency can support decisions that maintain the status quo,
even if this leads people to “throw good money after bad.”20
People also use information that is easy to access when making
decisions and may passively accept risks if those risks, such as
earthquakes, are not highly regarded in the environment or
“framework” of the decision to be made.21 People rely on
intuition to set a frame for decisions: they may assume that a
building is safe because a public authority granted a permit,
even though the permit was granted prior to the local
discovery of vulnerability to earthquake. Such limitations are
not alleviated when investing in a capital asset such as a
house, even though a house is likely to be the most expensive
investment a person will make.22 Social desires for conformity
and bandwagon effects, in addition to cost or price, can
override the concern people may otherwise have for choosing
safe locations, selecting safe designs for development,
investing in seismic retrofits and insurance, and becoming
prepared for earthquakes.23 Experience, good information, and
prompt feedback are important factors that assist people in
19. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting
Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999).
21. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 4, at 1459–60. Kahneman concludes that:
[P]eople’s views of decisions and outcomes are normally characterized by ‘narrow
framing’ . . . . [D]ecisions made in narrow frames depart far more from risk
neutrality than decisions that are made in a more inclusive context. The
prevalence of narrow frames is an effect of accessibility [of salient
information] . . . . Narrow frames generally reflect the structure of the
environment in which decisions are made. The choices that people face arise one
at a time, and the principle of passive acceptance suggests that they will be
considered as they arise. The problem at hand and the immediate consequences of
the choice will be far more accessible than all other considerations, and as a result
decision problems will be framed far more narrowly than the rational model
assumes.
Id.
22. Id. at 1468–69 (“A growing literature of field research and field experiments
documents large and systematic mistakes in some of the most consequential financial
decisions that people make, including . . . actions in the real estate market.”) (citing
David Genesove & Christopher J. Mayer, Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence
from the Housing Market, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1233 (2001)).
23. See KATHLEEN TIERNEY, THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF RISK: PRODUCING DISASTERS,
PROMOTING RESILIENCE 48 (Karlene H. Roberts & Ian I. Mitroff eds., 2014) (discussing
the sociological origins of development at risk of disaster and institutional inertia,
including bandwagon effects and conformity amongst consumers).
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making good decisions, but none of these characteristics are
currently available to people as they place themselves and
their assets at risk of mega-earthquakes in the Cascade
Subduction Zone.24
IV. RISKS TODAY BECOME INVESTMENTS TO BE MADE
TOMORROW
For local government planners, architects, engineers, and
financial officers contemplating the next capital investment or
permit, standard methods of assessing the value and risk of
loss are not helpful in raising awareness of actual
vulnerability. A two-fold problem is created by methods used to
value assets in the future through discounting and to
communicate the risk of extreme events. Discount rates, as
applied in cost-benefit analyses, were invented to express the
bias humans have for present expenditures over future
savings.25 Applied to capital investments, however, discounting
can result in severe problems, as durable assets appear to be
disproportionately less appealing than short-lived assets with
early returns on investment.26 Discount rates that reward
24. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 72 (2008) (“In many areas, ordinary
consumers are novices, interacting in a world inhabited by experienced professionals
trying to sell them things. More generally, how well people choose is an empirical
question, one whose answer is likely to vary across domains. It seems reasonable to
say that people make good choices in contexts in which they have experience, good
information, and prompt feedback . . . . They do less well in contexts in which they are
inexperienced and poorly informed, and in which feedback is slow or infrequent”).
25. See generally Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A
Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002) (reviewing the origins,
assumptions, and inadequacies, of the discounted utility model of intertemporal
decision-making).
26. Carl Koopmans & Piet Rietvold, Long-term Impacts of Mega-projects: The
Discount Rate, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON MEGA-PROJECTS 314–15 (Hugo
Priemus & Bert van Wee eds., 2013). Koopmans and Rietvold explain that although it
is common to use discount rates derived from capital markets, “measured by means of
the interest rate on government bonds” in capital investments, when doing so, “rates
derived from financial decisions on a time scale of at most a few decades may be
applied to benefits and costs that occur over (much) longer periods, affecting future
generations” and that, critically, this approach assumes “that welfare can be freely
(re)distributed among generations within a country” such that if the current
generation invests in a facility to benefit future generations in one respect, it “might
reduce its endowments to future generations in other respects.” Id. The exhaustion of
resources by current generations without compensation violates this assumption, and
the widespread unsustainable use of natural resources without compensation explains
how inequities arise from referencing capital markets when setting discount rates on
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short-term investments dissuade people from making
expenditures in seismic safety, which would improve value
over the long-term. Risk is understood as exposure to danger,
but it is often expressed as the probability that an event of a
given magnitude will occur in a given timeframe.27 While
probability is a scientifically meaningful concept, it does not
translate well into the policy environment of extreme future
hazards. Placed up against the propensity to spend for shortterm gain, estimates of the probability of an extreme event can
give people the illusion of safety, a loophole for those who have
other needs that they would prefer to prioritize. The
presentation of risk as the probability that an event will occur,
together with a bias for expenditures that earn present instead
of future value, produce the specter of an endless loop of
studies without decisive action about the problem of
earthquakes.28
V.

CONCLUSION: TO SAFEGUARD INVESTMENTS,
INTERNALIZE THE EXTERNALITY

The conundrum for earthquake-safe capital investment
created by these biases and distortions in decision-making will
require many problem-solving efforts, but the starting point is
relatively simple. Decision-makers should be provided with the
estimated financial losses to their buildings and infrastructure
should an extreme event occur today, based on the
reconstruction or rehabilitation costs of existing and proposed
capital assets, shown in nominal values (i.e., current prices). 29
This is specialized knowledge that people currently lack when
weighing, or framing, their capital investment decisions.
durable capital investments. Id. Similarly, capital investments made without regard to
impending future losses from earthquake violate this assumption, posing what may be
severe problems of intergenerational equity. Id.
27. Cf. Your Earthquake Risk, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/your-earthquake-risk
(last visited May 11, 2017) (“Three main factors together determine seismic risks: the
level of seismic hazard, the number of people and amount of property that are exposed
to seismic hazards and how vulnerable these people and property are to the hazards.”).
28. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert & Sandi Doughton, Washington’s 30-Year Earthquake
Drill for the ‘Big One’: Order Studies. Ignore Them. Repeat., THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jan.
27, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/northwest/washington30-year-earthquake-drill-for-big-one-order-studies-ignore-them-repeat/;
Doughton,
supra note 17.
29. Displaying future costs in nominal values is the functional equivalent of using a
zero discount rate.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss2/7

10

Whittington: Invest to Withstand the Test of Time: Capital Planning for High-I

454

WASH. J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y

[Vol. 7:2

Without this information, it is unlikely that the effects of an
impending earthquake would be incorporated into their
investment decisions.
In economic terms, extreme future events are externalities.
They are generally not part of the deal that is made when a
permit is granted or a capital asset is constructed. If protection
against a hazard is not part of the price paid for a capital
investment, then the hazard, real as it may be, is external to
the transaction that brought about the capital investment.
Making estimates of the damage or loss forecasted from
earthquakes as plain to see as capital construction costs
creates transparency for the externality, and provides a basis
for discussion about the difficult trade-offs that the threat of a
9.0 earthquake brings to the residents of the region. Presented
alongside the added cost of protecting a new asset with seismic
reinforcement, forecasts of losses from earthquakes can
motivate developers to internalize the externality within the
design of buildings and infrastructure. Set against the cost to
retrofit existing assets, such forecasts of loss serve as
appropriate financial targets for capital investment across the
region, even if such targets appear so large that it may only be
possible to fill the gap incrementally over time. Forecasts of
loss also describe in dollar values the benefits of regulatory
changes in the long-term interest of residents, such as changes
in building codes. Similarly, for the damages that remain
unforeseen or unavoidable, they create a target for capital
reserves that policymakers, businesses, homeowners, and
other residents can begin to take into account. This is a
difficult but necessary step. Catastrophe is expensive, yet the
effort to avoid catastrophe also comes at a cost. The people of
the Cascadia region will have to bear one or face the other.
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